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INTRODUCTION
Even as mediation has come to be a dominant force in settling such
cases as rear-end SUV collision accident claims in Terrebonne Parish,
Louisiana,' mediation has become a major force in settling international
business disputes.2 The principles and techniques involved in mediating
the two kinds of disputes are very much the same, with a leavening of
cross cultural complexity for the latter.3 The purpose of this paper is to
show the fundamental similarity of international business mediation to
. Judge Ren6 H. Himel Professor of Law, Tulane University. The author also serves as
a mediator on the panel of Mediation Arbitration Professional Systems, Inc. (MAPS), in
New Orleans, where his area of specialization is corporate and commercial mediation.
The author is also an arbitrator with the American Arbitration Association, the National
Association of Securities Dealers, and the National Arbitration Forum. He has served
as Corporate and Securities Editor of the World Arbitration and Mediation Report,
where he wrote monthly on recent developments in business mediation and arbitration.
He has made presentations on negotiation and mediation to large law firms and Fortune
500 companies, as well as to international audiences. He has served as a Special
Counsel to the Corporate Section of the Jones Walker law firm in New Orleans. He has
served and serves as a consultant/expert witness in corporate, securities and class action
cases both domestically and internationally. He is also a co-author, of FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS (6th ed. 2003). He is the author of CORPORATE
TAX PLANNING: TAKEOVERS, LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND RESTRUCTURINGS (1990 &
Supp. 1997).
1. "Parish" is Louisiana-speak for "county."
2. All of the leading international arbitration organizations provide the choice of
mediation. Among these organizations are: the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, itself an organization of the World Bank),
the Center for Public Resources (CPR) and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).
3. Although there are those who might say that, given the extreme diversity in
Louisiana, mediating in Terrebonne Parish presents as much of a cultural challenge as
any international mediation.
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domestic mediation, to discuss the overlay of additional problems that
international mediation presents, and to discuss particular mediation
tactics-including playing the "culture card"-that can be employed to
overcome cultural problems in international business mediations.4
I. MEDIATION ACROSS THE BOARD
Unlikely as it may sound, the principles involved in mediating the
international business dispute are the same as mediating the rear-end
SUV collision in Terrebonne Parish. I say this because I happen to have
a rather wide exposure to mediation and alternative dispute resolution,
having mediated or attended as an observer or arbitrated cases ranging
from indeed rear-end SUV collisions in Terrebonne Parish on up through
business and securities problems, finally on up through employment and
financial problems arising from major international transactions.
In all of these various types of cases, the advantages of mediation
remain the same: avoiding the risks, expense, delay and the stress of
litigation. These factors are discussed further below.
As a backdrop to the discussion it should be noted that recent data
suggest that the settlement rate for litigated cases is exceedingly high,
belying the public myth of a "litigation explosion."6 It would appear to
be much more accurate to say that there is a "settlement explosion."
4. International political mediations are not discussed in this Article. For that
fascinating topic, see HERDING CATS: MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 1999) (providing a variety of case studies, but giving little attention
to overall mediation technique).
5. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4, 44 (1983) (stating that cases that run the full course of litigation are
likely to be "more protracted, more elaborate, more exhaustive, and more expensive").
Also note that avoiding arbitration is another advantage of mediation.
6. With respect to business litigation, the settlement effect is very powerful. Ross
E. Cheit & Jacob E. Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of
State Court Litigation, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 789, 797 (2000) (finding that in cases
with at least one business entity on each side, less than 3% of the cases even reached the
opening of the trial). Interestingly, the rates of settlement of cases vary depending on
the area of law involved. The Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP), sponsored by
the U.S. Department of Justice and the University of Wisconsin, collected litigation data
in both state and federal court in five judicial districts. Their results showed the
following trial rates: torts 10%; civil rights 15%; domestic relations 25%. The
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Mediation is right in the thick of this "settlement explosion." The
data indicate that the settlement rate for mediation approaches 80%.7 It
might be argued that while 80% is a good settlement rate, it is not as
high as the overall case settlement rate which is apparently as high as
92%.8 Thus it might be argued that mediation is not apparently effective.
However, such an argument could not be more in error. These
settlement percentages make reference to different populations. Many
of the cases that go to mediation are cases that the attorneys involved
could not settle by themselves. Thus the mediation population is made
up of disproportionately tough cases. In most of the cases that I
encounter in my mediation practice, the attorneys have previously
attempted to settle. From these perspectives, an 80% settlement rate is
an outstanding result. As another anecdotal piece of evidence, I see
many lawyers as repeat players in the mediation practice. Since they
have had ample opportunity to observe the process, they must think the
process has value or they would not keep coming back.
And what value does mediation bring to the table? As alluded to
above, the value of mediation lies in its avoidance of the following
hazards of litigation or arbitration: costs, risk of a poor result, delay, and
stress.9 Perhaps the greatest over-arching principle is this: In mediation,
the parties don't ever get a result they have not agreed to. The parties
are, to use an overworked phrase, "empowered." Not only are the
parties empowered as to result, they are empowered as to process.
I have had parties in private caucuses stand up, pace around and tell
their lawyers to "shut up," while they sounded off about the case. The
lawyers sit there meek as a lamb, which can be a good thing. This never
happens in a courtroom- it cannot. For many parties in a case, this is
relatively high domestic relations trial rate may arise from the high emotional content of
such cases. However, it probably also reflects the fact that the court record in a
domestic relations case must show a resolution and thus a trial must be recorded.
Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Grey, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 164 (1986).
7. Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis
of Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12 NEGOT. J. 259, 261 (1996)
(noting settlement rate of 78%).
8. See id.
9. A further disadvantage of arbitration, of course, is the lack of any appeal. One
bite at the apple is all one gets, bitter or misguided as the bite might turn out to be.
2004]
452 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
the only lawsuit they will ever experience. In a mediation, their memory
of it will not only be the result-it will be that they had some say about
what happened, that they called a shot, that their agreement was required.
These emotional, client-empowering arguments for mediation can
easily be seen to be important to the parties in the case of the rear-end
SUV collision in Terrebonne Parish. 10 In the Terrebonne Parish case,
the injured plaintiff, with his Cajun cadence, was being paid by Tri-West
Insurance Company for lost future wages, for past and future medical
bills, for back injuries and for pain and suffering." This was paid, after
mediation, by the Tri-West adjuster flown in from Atlanta and her local
outside counsel, as they took this one off their case management file,
hitting a little below the number they were authorized, and moved on to
the next case, coming out of Grand Isle. The parties were not too
unhappy, and the black cloud that was this case has been wiped out of
their lives and careers. They controlled it. In lawyer-speak, Tri-West
didn't take a big pop and the plaintiff didn't get zeroed. Anything can
happen when you put it to a jury. Even if the jury talks like you, that
doesn't mean they'll give you home cooking.
The same considerations come into play when the case is at the other
end of the business spectrum. Let us consider the example of a failed
agreement by a French company to license a line of clothes in the U.S.,
which triggered a resignation by the CEO. The CEO wants to collect his
severance package, which is disputed by a shareholders' derivative suit.
Notwithstanding that the parties and their attorneys are all experienced in
business, there is the same concern about the loss of control and about
matters going in directions unfathomed. This creates a desire to throw
some fixed, predictable amount of money at the complex problem to make
it go away. And the great thing about it is that you don't have to do the
law school thing-analyze doctrines, facts, consider motions, venues, and
all the rest. You don't have to write an exam. Just a check.
From humble beginnings, mediation is moving to the forefront of
dispute resolution. In Europe, it is coming to challenge arbitration as the
leading method of resolution of business disputes.
10. Terrebone Parish lies in Southwestern Louisiana, and is home to the cities of
Houma and Thibidoux. Quail hunting in the region is excellent.
11. This case is a fictitious amalgam of cases that I have encountered in my
experience.
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II. THE LOGIC THAT DRIVES PARTIES TO MEDIATION
I have seen it happen over and over again: parties posturing,
threatening to walk out, asserting that their hands are tied and that they
cannot make a deal, and giving their bottom line number way out of the
range of the other side. And yet, several hours later, they sign on to a
deal that is much less favorable than their earlier "bottom line"
positions. Why? A number of factors drive parties to settle. The
existence of these factors make the mediator's job easier. In some ways,
the mediator's job is best viewed as facilitating the parties' grope toward
settlement, smoothing away the rough edges. The costs and the flaws in
the legal system drive parties to settlement, with the mediator there to
ease the way.'
2
As Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit said:
Whether we have too many cases or too few, or even, miraculously
precisely the right number, there can be little doubt that the system is
not working very well. Too many cases take too much time to be
resolved and impose too much cost upon litigants and taxpayers
alike. No one should have to wait five years for a case to come to
trial, but many litigants in this country face this reality. Legal
expenses should not exceed damage awards, yet in the asbestos
litigation morass, for example, those expenses total $1.56 for every
$1 provided to a victim. If long delays and high litigation costs were
aberrational, systemic change could safely be avoided. But we know
the problem is more serious. Even if the modem defenders of our
current litigation level are right, system wide averages should not
obscure the long delays and high costs imposed upon hundreds of
thousands who use or participate in the litigation process and the losses
endured by those who are deterred from seeking redress in court.
13
12. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS H. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LITIGATION vi-vii (1986) (noting that the total nationwide expenditure for tort
litigation in state and federal courts in 1985 was $29 to $36 billion and that plaintiffs
received $14 to $16 billion of this amount after deduction of their litigation costs).
13. Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process,
94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1644-45 (1985).
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The delay can have various pernicious effects. The injured personal
injury or business plaintiff must continue to pay legal and other
expenses while waiting for the supposed ship to come in. 14
In fact, what may be happening is that the litigation system is just
serving as a backdrop or "dumb show" against which the real action-
settlement/mediation-is played out. Essentially what each side tries to
do in mediation-with the mediator's assistance-is to show the other
side the strengths of its case and the weaknesses of the opponent's case.
That at least is what happens in the zero-sum positional bargaining that
characterizes mediations for auto accidents, legal or medical malpractice,
property damage, business tort, interference with contractual relations,
breach of fiduciary duty and many other business damage cases.
These kinds of cost and mini-litigation factors drive many cases to
settlement, whether they are auto accident or international business
matters.
Even if a party presses doggedly ahead to litigation and gets "more"
than perhaps would have been received in a mediated settlement, the
costs-whether in stress or internal employee time consumed-could
still render the net amount received negative. 5
Often the legal system is used strategically to wear down the other
side, rather than to serve the goal of a "quest for truth." In corporate
hostile takeovers, for example, litigation frequently arises out of
supposed failures of the other side to comply with the myriad applicable
state and federal rules. The purpose of the litigation can be simply to
14. In personal injury cases, the plaintiff's medical bills may or may not have been
covered by some third party, such as health insurance or workman's compensation or
union insurance. The third parties may then under state law have a lien against any
judgment the plaintiff receives. The existence of the lien can complicate the mediation
process as these third parties may intervene in the case and indeed have to be included
in the mediation, where they may give up some of what they are in order to facilitate a
settlement.
The delay in a personal injury case can cause a further "deadweight loss," to employ a
law and economics analysis. Since one of the claims of the injured party is often a
claim for future wages, the delay in the case can mean that the plaintiff may decline to
take a constructive job that he could actually perform, so as not to undermine his future
wages claim.
15. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72, 78-79 (1983).
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wear down the other side, or to keep them off balance. 6 The ability of
one side to impose a high litigation cost on the other side is a factor that,
for better or worse, has to be taken account of in the cold light of reality
when mediation settlement negotiations are approached. The wear-
down litigation threat is a factor that can drive all forms of litigation to a
mediated settlement, since it often proves to be expensive both for the
plaintiff and the defendant.
In addition to the debilitating effects of costs and delays on the
parties, there is another factor that confuses the issue when it comes to
the decision to mediate. With all due respect to my judge friends, I call
it the myth of judicial infallibility. How likely is it that a judge, pressed
as he or she is with many other cases and duties, is going to get the
"right" answer in every case? A similar argument can be made with
respect to a jury (again no slur on family members of mine or readers
who have served on juries). The judge and/or jury are necessarily not
going to know the case as well as the parties. This raises the distinct
possibility of an "oddball" or outlier decision. A number could be
produced that is far too high or too low, outside the parties'
expectations. As the mediator says to the parties, in persuading them to
mediate: In litigation, one party could make out like crazy while the
other party gets killed. Who wants to take that chance? Most people are
risk averse 17 and would prefer not to play that game.
In mediation, the knowledge that both sides come to possess
through painstaking discovery or by virtue of living through it can be
taken fully into account in helping both sides to evaluate the case. This
16. See DANIEL Q. PosiN, CORPORATE TAX PLANNING: TAKEOVERS, LEVERAGED
BUYOUTS, AND RESTRUCTURINGS 949-1305 (1990 & Supp. 1997) (giving blow-by-
blow descriptions of hostile takeovers and associated litigation).
17. See Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. POL. ECON. 151 (1952)
(explaining that people will take large chances of a small loss for a small chance of a
large gain); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON.
61, 101-07 (1971) (explaining economic model predicting when litigants will choose
settlement over trial); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (explaining economic model predicting that
suits that do not settle split 50-50 for plaintiffs and defendants); Robert D. Cooter &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989) (explaining economic model predicting when litigants
will choose settlement over trial); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private
Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, II J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982)
(discussing the divergence between private and social goods in litigation).
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is an argument that can be used by a mediator to encourage the
settlement of any kind of case. Indeed a fairer result is achieved in
mediation, if one is concerned globally with ultimate fairness in dispute
resolution. The case for mediation is indeed most persuasive in the
complex business or international transaction, where the potential for
misunderstanding on the part of the judge or jury is greatest. Moreover,
the potential for creative remedies is severely truncated in judicial
proceedings. Settlements that grow out of a mediation can contemplate
a rich panoply of remedies, including agreements to work together in the
future, covenants not to compete, structured settlements, 8 earn-outs 9
and apologies.20 In international business transactions, apology can
indeed play a major role, as an apology is extremely highly regarded in
some cultures.21
The "win or lose" aspect of a judicial decision can also be quite
stressful to the parties, bringing on an intense emotional experience even
in the business setting. Who among litigators has not had a client who
sees himself or herself as a warrior in some historic confrontation?-
"the whole world is watching." In fact, the whole world is not watching.
A mediator can drain some of the starch out of the parties' overheated
view of themselves in a way that the party's own lawyer often cannot.
The mediator can indeed serve as a face-saving device for aggressive
18. In the accident case, structured settlements (or payments over the lifetime of
the young, severely injured plaintiff) can be attractive to all hands. It puts the money in
safekeeping and away from perhaps the grasping hands of older relatives. There can be
tax advantages to the insurance company setting the program up. See DANIEL Q. POSIN
& DONALD TOBIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS app. 1 (6th ed. 2003).
Plaintiffs' attorneys are sometimes resistant to structured settlements since it means
they will have to wait for their money as well.
19. Earn-outs, or payments that are a percentage of future profits or revenues, can
be very attractive in the business setting when the value of a business is in dispute. See
POSIN, supra note 16 at 1.31.6; see also Max H. Bazerman & James J. Gillespie,
Betting on the Future: The Virtues of Contingent Contracts, 77 HARv. Bus. REV. 155,
156-58 (Sept.-Oct. 1999) (suggesting that a contingent contract might have been a way
to settle the lengthy Department of Justice case against IBM, although it is doubtful that
the government would ever agree to that kind of settlement).
20. See Ann J. Kellett, Healing Angry Wounds: the Roles of Apology and
Mediation in Disputes Between Physicians and Patients, 1987 J. DISP. RES. 111 (1987).
21. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law
and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461 (1986).
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counsel. 22  The parties' self-aggrandizement of the dispute in the
international business setting can be destructive of their ability to work
together in the future if that is to be contemplated.
Moreover, the decision in the court case is a matter of public record
the way a mediation is not. In the mediated settlement, there is not a
public decision as to who was "right" and who was "wrong. This can
be a major factor in the complex international business setting for
various reasons. A public finding of "wrongdoing" in the business
setting can have repercussions for further business transactions,
reputational and otherwise. In addition, a public finding of an example
of "wrongdoing" might set the table for further litigation by other
plaintiffs on collateral matters. Again, this is an argument in favor of
mediation (under a confidentiality agreement-which is the way most
mediations are conducted).2 4
22. In my experience, on numerous occasions an attorney will ask the mediator to
"work on the client," in the sense of lowering the client's expectations.
23. An example here is the recent divorce settlement of Jack Welch, former CEO
of General Electric, and his wife Jane Beasley Welch. Although a mediator was not
involved in the case, the settlement of this case four days before it was to come to trial
obviously spared the Welches considerable public embarrassment and public
"judgment." Apparently, Mr. Welch had become involved with another woman during
his marriage, and the details of that relationship might have surfaced in court.
However, the settlement did not come soon enough to spare Jack Welch substantial
public attention. Ms. Beasley filed papers in court in September, 2002, detailing a
variety of perks that G.E. had agreed to provide to Mr. Welch, some of them for the rest
of his life, these included floor-level seats to New York Knicks games and courtside
seats at the U.S. Open Tennis matches. Also included were all costs associated with a
Manhattan apartment that the Welches lived at when they were in New York. These
apartment costs included wine and food, laundry, toiletries, newspapers, and dining
expenses at the restaurant in the building, the Jean Georges. The existence of these
perks was not explicitly set forth in the securities filings by GE and would not have
come to light but for the litigation disclosures. The revelation of these perks caused a
furor among investors and corporate governance critics. Mr. Welch defended the perks,
but ultimately agreed to pay for a number of them himself. This example demonstrates
not only that settlement is a good idea, but that settling sooner (i.e., before key court
papers are filed) is better than settling later. The utility of settling sooner rather than
later has been detailed in ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING
To CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 225 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000). For
details of the Welch marital breakup, see Geraldine Fabrikant, Welches Reach Divorce
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at C2.
24. Many states have enacted mediation confidentiality statutes. These statutes
generally rely on a combination of pri.vileges, testimonial incapacity, and/or evidentiary
2004] 457
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In discussing the drawbacks of litigation, of course, attention must
be paid to Lon Fuller's seminal article The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication," in which he argues that a number of institutional
rigidities surrounding court decision-making render courts unable to
respond to a variety of issues.2 6  We demand from adjudication an
extremely high level of rationality, as opposed to just random individual
choice or preference.27 Moreover, Fuller argues, whatever is submitted
to judges for decision tends to be converted by them into a claim of right
or an accusation of fault or guilt.
28
As applied to the discussion of international mediation, the
phenomenon Fuller identifies-namely, rigidity in the decision-process,
or the "winner take all" approach-is particularly troublesome to the
parties to an international business dispute. This creates the kind of
sophisticated incentive to mediate to which the parties to a complex
business transaction are likely to understand and respond.
Fuller makes the related point that there are some areas of human
activity that do not lend themselves to a pervasive delimitation of rights
and wrong.2 9 This would certainly be the case with respect to the
complex arrangements one finds in international business transactions.
Thus, mediating out of a complex cave-in of business affairs makes a
whole lot more sense than trying to line the parties up for a decision on
who is right and wrong on a variety of issues. Money carries no moral
imperative. Saying "we just throw money at the problem to make it go
exclusions to foreclose testimony regarding mediations in legal proceedings. Many
states provide exceptions to confidentiality on various issues. However, a major issue
with these types of statues is the extent to which confidentiality can be breached to
prove the existence of the mediated agreement for enforcement purposes. See generally
Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the
States, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1553, 1578-79 (1994); Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust
Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 99, 121-22
(2003).
25. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978).
26. Id. at 366.
27. Id. at 365.
28. Id. at 368.
29. Id. at 371. See also Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963
Wis. L. REv. 3 (1963).
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away" is a good face-saving approach. Again, these are points the
mediator can make to the sophisticated parties as the mediation unfolds.3"
It is indeed in the areas of complex business transactions that
Fuller's analysis as to what is inherently unsuited for adjudication
applies the best. Fuller gives as one of his examples of controversies
that courts are unsuited to adjudicate the instance of receiving the task in
a socialist regime of setting all wages and prices.3 Fuller points out that
the repercussions of a change, for example, in the price of aluminum, on
a variety of areas of the economy are beyond the ken of a court.
I would add that this is why courts attempt to avoid making
economic or managerial decisions or running business by relying on
such doctrines as the business judgment rule.32
III. MEDIATION TECHNIQUE
The standard mediation process would be modified in various ways
to take account of the fact that the dispute involves international
business transactions.
The mediator's opening statement is a very important place for the
mediator to start to play. Mediators often fail to take full advantage of
the opening statement to salt it with some ideas that can help them down
the road. Where all the parties are sophisticated, as usually happens in
international business transactions, it is often easy for the mediator to
miss some opportunities in the opening statement. It is often assumed
by mediators that the opening statement is just for the uninitiated party
who has not done this before.
But in the international business mediation, one may find only
lawyers and corporate party representatives who are themselves
professionals, who have done it before. In that event, the mediator,
observing that there are only "professionals" in the room, may be
30. I will also say that dropping Lon Fuller's name and the Harvard Law Review,
while making a point, is a good way to command the parties' attention and move them a
little closer to settlement.
31. Fuller, supra note 25, at 394.
32. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that
Chicago Cubs owner P.K. Wrigley's decision not to allow night baseball at Wrigley
field, thereby losing attendance revenues, was a matter of business judgment and not
reviewable by the court). See generally THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY:
FINAL REPORT OF COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984).
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inclined to give short shrift to the opening statement. This would be on
the grounds that "everyone already knows what's going on." However,
everyone doesn't "already know what's going on." If they did, they
would have already settled this case. What many of the most
professional of lawyers and party representatives may not be ready for is
that they are probably going to agree to a result that they do not like and
were not contemplating. The sooner they hear some general statements
about "over-optimism" by parties-litigant, the better.
The opening statement is the one certain opportunity that the
mediator has to be able to address all the parties and their counsel
simultaneously. It is a good opportunity for the mediator to establish
him or herself as a player in this dispute in which the parties have
hitherto been engaging without the mediator and to give the impression
that "things are going to be a little bit different now., 33 The mediator's
opening statement can be used to drain off some of the drama and create
a sense of forward motion in the process, remind the various sides (often
an international mediation is multi-lateral) that a process will occur here,
not just a rubber stamp of the position they brought in.
The parties themselves in their opening statements should be
encouraged to tell their story from the beginning, even though the other
parties may know the story well. Once again, it's useful for the other
parties to hear the contrasting story from the beginning. If everyone lays
out his or her position one after the other, that "normalizes" all the
stories. There's an implication that all the stories are equally valid (or
flawed). That conveys a very valuable message that no lawyer from any
one side can covey to his or her client: "This is not going to be a cake-
walk for anybody."34
Using the terminology of Leonard Riskin's well-known grid
methodology,35 the mediator in the international business dispute should
33. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 230-32, (favoring the use of a mediator or
negotiation counsel to "change the game"in intractable negotiations).
34. Unless, of course, the facts and law of the case are heavily weighted in favor of
one side or the other. This process is then a quick way to let the weaker side know just
how outgunned it is.
35. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12
ALTERNATIVES 111 (1994). Professor Riskin is updating his grid in an article
forthcoming in the Notre Dame Law Review. In this updated version he places
emphasis on whether the mediator or the parties influence the decision process across a
wide variety of issues.
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review in preparation whether he or she is taking a narrow role and is
thus likely to be more evaluative, or a broader role and thus likely to be
more facilitative.36 Given the complexity of the usual international
business transaction, one might expect that the mediator would take a
broader view and would be on the look-out for integrative opportunities
that the parties themselves may have overlooked. 3 As to the narrower
view, though it would be expected that the mediator would have subject-
matter expertise, it is likely that the parties themselves are capable of
going very far in analyzing the case if the issue is really one with a
narrow focus. Thus the evaluative mode might only be helpful in
closing the final gap. At the same time of course, the closer one gets to
the final gap, necessarily the less evaluative guidance the mediator can
provide. Who can say whether a particular claim or a particular business
is worth $10,750,000 or $10,250,000?3
It is also to be expected that counsel in an international business
mediation are going to be extremely able. Able counsel on both sides
can greatly facilitate a mediation. The circumstance of able counsel,
coupled with the fact that in an international business transaction, there
is likely to be a great deal of money at stake, strongly suggests a
facilitative mode by the mediator. I suggest the mediator consider an
extreme facilitative mode in such a case. As an initial approach, just
help the parties find their deal, don't get in the way. Also, as suggested
above, the facilitative mediator should keep his or her eyes open for
integrative possibilities or deals that can create value for both sides.
In my view, the mediator should make extensive use of caucuses in
international business disputes.39 The mediator should plant in the
36. See id.
37. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 224-49 (offering advice for settling
disputes integratively, including exploiting differences in time or risk preferences,
increasing the range of trades available, settling early and using decision analysis to
evaluate a case); DAVID LAX & JAMES SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR 90-
95 (1986) (stating that gains from negotiations arise because negotiators differ from one
another and have different preferences about the issues; thus fruitful trades can occur.)
Cf Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO L.J. 369 (1996).
38. Once the parties' get that close, the age-old technique of "split-the-difference,"
is of course an excellent way to proceed. Other gap-closing techniques include: "Would
you take X if I could get it from the other side?" "Would you offer Y if they'll offer Z?"
39. See generally Christopher W. Moore, The Caucus: Private Meetings that
Promote Settlement, 16 MEDIATION Q. 87 (1987).
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opening statement the likelihood that the parties will break into separate
caucuses, so that the parties do not find the procedure surprising.
There are a number of advantages of caucuses. First, it's different.
While the parties and/or their attorneys have probably tried to negotiate
the dispute previously (and by hypothesis failed), it's extremely unlikely
that they did so by ensconcing themselves in separate rooms in a suite
and then walking back and forth among the rooms.
So the mediator brings something different and of value to the
process by establishing the separate caucuses. In the caucuses, the
mediator can also speak more freely in terms of suggesting weaknesses
in the case of the party to whom he or she is speaking. It is also useful
in caucus to point out more generally the great disadvantages of the
default dispute resolution process in the case, whether it be litigation or
arbitration.40 Also, it may help to point out to the particular party in a
caucus why it especially wants to eschew litigation, because of good will
problems created, or the potential of bringing other hidden plaintiffs out
of the woodwork, or the expense, time and risk. The private caucuses,
of course, also afford the mediator the opportunity to do a little "double-
entry bookkeeping"-namely, emphasizing to each side privately why
their case is weak-all in the spirit of good old-fashioned mediator
technique.
Early in the mediation in the complex international business
dispute, it may be helpful to identify the issues and lay them out.
Indeed, if there are multiple complex issues, it can be useful to list them
on a blackboard, a whiteboard, or simply a giant Scotch Post-it. The
mediator should make sure that the parties in each room have the same
list to look at. This helps break a complex problem down and promotes
the possibility of integrative bargaining as the parties, in looking at the
list with the mediator's help, may see issues they can swap.
A good technique in the complex case is to start with the easy
problems first, to get some momentum going. More complex issues can
be postponed.41 While most accident-type cases settle in less than a day,
there is no reason why a complex international business case must meet
40. Arbitration has many of the disadvantages of litigation including being, time-
consuming, expensive and stressful. In addition, as pointed out above, it has the major
disadvantage of no appeal.
41. See Susan S. Sibley & Sall E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
POL'y 7, 17-18 (1986).
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that short time frame, although it can be quite an effective technique to
create an atmosphere of: "We have to settle it today. If Floyd has to fly
out of town this afternoon, we'll get his cell phone number and he
should call from the plane if he can." Creating some end-of-the-day
excitement and panic that "we don't have much time to wrap this up"
has its place as a technique. Of course, matters can be continued by
phone the next day or scheduled for a subsequent meeting, if need be. In
that case, the mediator might want to try to give each of the parties some
"homework," for the problems that they are having.
Another approach in the complex -international business
environment is the "Agreement in Principle. 42 Under this concept an
overarching formula is created which is then applied to individual
issues.43 This is the opposite of the break-it down approach described
above. There is obviously no one correct way to approach a complex
international business dispute. Indeed, the illusion of progress in the
negotiations can be created with the parties by discussing whether they
would like to use the break-it-down approach or the "agreement in
principle" approach. Once they agree on the approach, we have
progress! The attractive aspect of either of these approaches is that they
afford the opportunity for the parties to agree on small parts of the
problem one-step-at-a-time, thus breaking the problem down and
creating the illusion of momentum as agreement is reached on the
smaller problems. As the old saying goes, "You eat an elephant one bite
at a time." Another approach that can be employed in the complex,
international business environment is the "Single Text Negotiating
Document."" A document is proposed that purports to deal with all
problems. The parties then make additions, modifications, and/or
corrections to it.45 This ensures that at least all of the answers are in the
same place at the same time. This is also extremely useful for multiple
party cases, 46 and once again it allows for the agreements in small steps.
42. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT, 204-06 (1986).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 212-16.
45. Id.
46. I have used this technique in multiple party negotiations. I put out a draft with
all the key points filled in as a "starting point." The parties energetically marked it up
and the final consensus draft bore little resemblance to the original. The approach
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Reference to external standards is a major mediation and
negotiation technique at all levels of cases. This principle was
advocated early in Fisher, Ury and Patton's "Getting to Yes. 47 While
the literature has not hitherto made the connection, the external
standards level of analysis is very similar to the concept of "bargaining
in the shadow of the law. '48 Thus in a substantial number of cases, the
law is the relevant external standard. In that sense all mediations and
negotiations are conducted "in the shadow of the law."
At the level of mediating the rear-end SUV accident in Terrebonne
Parish, the parties may make reference to jury verdicts that have come
down in court and have been upheld on appeal. At the level of
mediating a shareholders' derivative suit challenging a CEO's severance
package, for example, bargaining in the shadow of the law-e.g., using
external standards-would involve making reference to any case law that
had addressed that issue.49
The external standards-bargaining in the shadow of the law
approach does not provide a final answer. However, it can eliminate
extreme "outlier" possibilities and narrow the scope of the
negotiation/mediation. This reference to external standards-bargaining
in the shadow of the law helps narrow the issues on the basis of 1)
fairness and 2) that which is possible in litigation.
Nevertheless, the parties are certainly not in total thrall to external
standards or the shadow of the law. A party can rightfully see his or her
case as different or more complex than anything in the contemplation of
external standards/shadow of the law. 0 A theme throughout the process
is that the mediator is both a conduit of information between the
seemed to create a good atmosphere because the parties were in a sense knocking me
down instead of each other.
47. See FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 81-95 (2d ed. 1991).
48. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case for Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
49. Cf Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (derivative suit
challenging CEO compensation based on waste).
50. See Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
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opposing sides and an impediment to transparent communication among
them.5
Or as I like to say: "It's the parties' negotiation, so don't mess it
up.
Let us now examine the deeply-rooted cross-cultural issues that can
confront the mediation of international business disputes.
IV. CROSS-CULTURAL ISSUES
In the previous section we discussed adapting the general mediation
technique to deal with international business disputes. We now explore
the cross cultural issues that are often confronted in the international
mediation of business transactions.
Any such discussion should start with the seminal study by Geert
Hofstede concerning various cultural attitudes toward work. 2 Hofstede
51. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown and Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323 (1994).
52. GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES (1980). See also DEAN ALLEN
FOSTER, BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS-HOW TO NEGOTIATE BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY
ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD 264-70 (1992) (applying Hofstede's research to
international negotiations); Jeanne M. Brett et al., Culture and Joint Gains in
Negotiation, 14 NEGOT. J. 61 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of sharing important
information that will help in trade-offs and dealing with information and issues
polychromatically instead of monochromatically); GARY P. FERRARO, THE CULTURAL
DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (2d ed. 1994); GLEN FISHER, INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION: A CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 17-59 (1980) (examining five
considerations: 1) collect information about how other side views negotiations; 2)
understand other side's style of negotiating-centralized or not, consensus or diffused;
3) investigate the "national character" of the other side, attitudes toward compromise,
styles of reasoning and the like; 4) cross cultural noise-for Americans, this includes
such things as using the first name prematurely, starting speeches with a joke; 5) be on
guard for problems arising from interpreters); DONALD W. HENDON ET AL., CROSS-
CULTURAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS (1996) (specifying seven categories of cultural
differences); DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES (1992)
(specifying nine dimensions); JEANNE M. BRETr, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO
NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL
BOUNDARIES (2001) (examining the negotiating strategies and results achieved by
groups of Americans, Israelis, Germans, and Hong Kong Chinese enrolled in
Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management Executive Master's program
on cross-cultural negotiations; the problem had great integrative potential, and the best
results were reached by the Israelis, with the Americans lagging).
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outlined four cultural dimensions that seem to explain value differences
among cultures that can affect the negotiation and mediation process.53
The first dimension is whether the culture follows high or lower
power distance. 4 In Hofstede's lexicon, a lower power distance culture
contemplates people valuing equalization of power and competence over
seniority.55 In a high power distance culture, people value status,
formality and hierarchy.
5 6
The second dimension in Hofstede's model is whether people in the
culture are risk takers or risk avoiders.51 Risk avoiders are averse to
risky and ambiguous situations. They prefer safe behavior and
conformity. Risk takers are more open to new ideas and problem
solving. 8
Hofstede's third dimension is whether the culture emphasizes
individualism or collectivism. 9 In individualistic cultures, people value
individual needs and independence over the community's needs. In a
collectivist culture, there is a high recognition of individuals'
interdependence, the importance of cooperation and the overriding needs
60
of the group.
Hofstede's fourth dimension relates to gender. 6' The question is
whether the culture is more "masculine" in that it values assertiveness,
competitiveness, and independence, or whether the culture is more
"feminine" in that it values nurturing, cooperation, and relationships.62
The leading commentator Jeswald Salacuse in his book, "Making
Global Deals, '63 specified ten ways that culture could impede a deal. It
would be up to the mediator who is on top of his job to defuse these
problems. Although Salacuse presents his points in the context of
53. Id.
54. Id. at 92.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 153.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 261.
62. Id. Apologies for the sexist tone of Hofstede's analysis. A better lexicon for
this dimension would have been, say, "assertiveness and cooperativeness." The use of
gender terms adds nothing to the analysis.
63. JESWALD SALACUSE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS: WHAT EVERY EXECUTIVE
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NEGOTIATING ABROAD 58-70 (1991).
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negotiating a deal de novo, these same issues can come up if a deal
comes unglued and a mediator is called upon to try to patch it up.
Moreover, from time to time mediators are called upon to help in the
negotiation of a deal de novo.
Salacuse's 10 factors are as follows:
1) Negotiating Goal: Contract or Relationship? Salacuse here
points out that an American in a contract negotiation tends to view the
goal as coming up with a signed contract. 64 Japanese and certain other
cultural groups view the goal of the negotiation as establishing a
relationship between the two sides.6
2) Negotiating Attitude: Win/Lose or Win/Win? Salacuse here
points out that because of culture or personality, or both, a party may
approach a negotiation as a win/lose or distributional negotiation or as a
win/win integrative negotiation.66
3) Personal Style: Informal or Formal? Here, the question is
whether a negotiator is "formal" or "informal" in the way he talks, uses
titles, dresses, speaks and interacts with others. The informal negotiator
inquires about the other side's family life, takes off his jacket and rolls
up his sleeves. This kind of conduct can put people off from other
cultures such as France, Japan, or Egypt. In those latter countries, for
example, using the first name right away is seen as an act of disrespect.67
4) Communication: Direct or Indirect? Negotiators from some
cultures, such as the U.S. or Germany, communicate directly. Other
cultures rely on circumlocutions, figures of speech, facial expressions,
gestures and other kinds of body language. This can create problems
when the negotiator from the direct culture does not get a firm, clear
response from the negotiator from the indirect culture or if the negotiator
from the indirect culture gets too forceful a response from the negotiator
from the direct culture.68
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id. at 60.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 63.
68. Id. at 64.
2004]
468 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
5) Sensitivity to Time: High or Low? This area is one of
stereotypes (e.g., Germans are always on time; Mexicans are always
late; Japanese negotiate slowly; and Americans move quickly to close a
deal). One result is that Americans try to reduce formalities and get
down to business quickly.69 Negotiators from other cultures, who view
the negotiation as creating an ongoing relationship, require more time
for the parties to get to know one another. Thus they can be suspicious
of attempts to shorten up the negotiating time.
70
6) Emotionalism: High or Low? Here the issue is again based on
stereotypes. Latin Americans are thought to show their emotions at the
bargaining table, whereas Japanese are thought to hide their feelings.
71
Salacuse states that individual personalities may overcome these cultural
stereotypes.72 But he does argue that culture provides different rules as
to the appropriateness of showing emotions and will influence behavior
in this area.73
7) Forms of Agreement: General or Specific? Cultural influences
play out heavily here as well. Americans tend to prefer very detailed
contracts, with everything spelled out, covering all circumstances no
matter how unlikely.7 4 In countries such as China, parties tend to prefer
a contract which is in the form of general principles rather than defined
rules. This appears to go back to the fact that the deal, to begin with, is
about establishing a long term relationship, not just one contract. 75
Negotiators from these cultures take the view that their relationship will
govern the results if there are some unforeseen circumstances.7 6 Taking
69. Id. at 65.
70. Id. I am constrained to observe here that often in mediations a party will
complain that "we are wasting time." This is usually because the other side has not
immediately accepted the party's early offer. But in terms of time, mediation is far
more efficient than litigation, in which there will be many days of hearings, depositions,
preparing and filing motions, and then the trial itself. Complaining that a mediation is
"wasting time" is the time sensitivity factor taken to the ultimate degree.
71. Id. at66.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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it one step further, the American drive to nail things down may well be
viewed with suspicion or as evidence that the Americans do not trust the
long-term relationship.77
My dissenting view in this area is that it is possible that the party
with the stronger bargaining position seeks to "lock up the deal" with a
variety of specific contract provisions whereas the party with the weaker
bargaining position often seeks to keep things general in order to avoid
the full impact of the bargaining position of the other side. This is a
non-cultural factor which may be weighed in the balance.
8) Building an Agreement: Bottom Up or Top Down? This refers
to the question of whether the agreement should be reached by settling
of a series of little problems or by agreeing on a few overarching
principles that are used to fill in the specific problems.78 Americans are
said to prefer to approach deals by settling each step one at a time.79 The
French are seen as having the top-down approach of agreeing on a few
general principles that are used to fill in the specific issues.80
In the "building down" approach, one party presents a maximum
deal if the other side accepts all the conditions. 8' In the "building up"
approach one party proposes a minimum deal which can be broadened
and increased as the other party accepts additional conditions.
8 2
I would add that in these formats the mediator can play an
instrumental role in assisting the parties in negotiating which approach
will be used. Once agreement has been reached on the approach (i.e.,
"progress" has been achieved), thereafter, the mediator can assist the
parties as they deal with the various particular provisions.
9) Team Organization: One Leader or Group Consensus? This idea
relates to how each negotiating team is organized. One extreme is that
there is one leader who has full authority to decide all issues.8 3 This
tends to be the American style.84 The other extreme is the case with a
77. Id.
78. Id. at 68.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 69.
84. Id.
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relatively larger number of negotiators and it is not clear who has the
authority to decide what."5 Note that this analysis relates very closely to
Hofstede's analysis when he talks about high or lower power distance. 6
10) Risk Taking: High or Low? According to Salacuse, some
cultures are more risk averse than others. 7 The degree that one side or
the other is willing to take risks in the negotiation process-to perhaps
facilitate integrative bargaining-is affected by the approach and
personality of the negotiator, which in turn is affected by his culture. "
This dovetails exactly with Hofstede's second area of analysis, which
also relates to whether the culture is risk averse or willing to assume
risk. 9
This factor also relates to Salacuse's ninth factor, regarding team
organization. It is very difficult for a negotiating team that operates on
group consensus to be a risk-taker. The Japanese tend to be risk averse
and operate on a team basis, whereas Americans, by comparison, are
risk-takers and tend to be organized from the top down.90
Again, the mediator should be prepared to explain these differences
to each side-preferably in private caucuses. The mediator can also
perform the useful role of reminding the parties of these differences as
the negotiation proceeds (or starts to break down).
Moreover, as Salacuse indicates, there can be integrative gains to
negotiation if the deal is hedged with mechanisms that appear to reduce
the risk to the risk-averse side, that are also acceptable to the less risk-
averse side. The mediator can play an important role in making these
suggestions.
85. Id. It has been argued, in the strictly American context, that the side that has
more negotiators has an advantage in the sense that "each person should have a say."
See Meltsner & Schrag, Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 259 (1973). That's a calculus that would not necessarily hold up
in the international setting, nor do Meltsner and Schrag argue that it would.
86. See HOFSTEDE, supra note 52 at 92.
87. See SALACUSE supra note 63, at 69.
88. Id.
89. See HOFSTEDE supra note 52, at 153.
90. See SALACUSE supra note 63, at 69.
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V. THE SURPRISING IMPORTANCE OF INTERPRETERS
At this juncture, it is useful to make the important, if obvious, point
that if the parties involved in the mediation are not fluent in the same
language, it is essential to hire an excellent interpreter. Avoiding
misunderstanding in mediation and reaching agreement is difficult
enough when the same language is involved. If different languages are
involved, the probability of a sheer misunderstanding throwing a
monkey-wrench into the works is increased geometrically. 9' Not only
must a first-class interpreter be hired, but the mediator needs to keep on
top of the language issue, ensuring that some particular turn of phrase
has not been understood in two different ways.
VI. PLAYING THE "CULTURE CARD" AS A MEDIATOR
After this extensive discussion of the culture factor, we are "all
dressed up with no place to go." What is the mediator of international
business transactions and disputes to do with the block of ideas and
analysis presented in the previous section?
It is not enough to memorize a load of facts about the particular
culture from which one side or the other comes.92 It is more important
to be sensitive to the fact that these cultural issues exist. The mediator
should attempt to pick up on them in the course of the mediation. Is
there something going on that we've missed?
An effective tactic is to put the cultural card on the table. Again the
mediator is much better suited to doing this than are the parties. The
mediator in the opening statement can point out that cultural issues,
whether in manners or in approaches to problems, may present a barrier
to reaching agreement. He can suggest that the parties may want to be
conscious of that fact as they go through the negotiation.
This has the useful effect of "planting the culture seed" early on and
raising the parties' consciousness of that factor. The matter can then be
91. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 47, at 32-36; Ileana Dominguez-Urban, "The
Messenger as the Medium of Communication: The Use of Interpreters in Mediation",
1997 J. Disp. RESOL. 1 (1997).
92. However, that is a good way to start. For a detailed study of the culture of
Japan, see generally ROSALIE L. TUNG, BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE
(1984).
2004]
472 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
referred to again as negotiations proceed and it appears that cultural
issues are kicking up some problems.
At the same time, it may be that such a frank statement of the
cultural issue at the beginning may be offensive to some cultures. It is
in the American style to bring up any possible problems early on in the
proceedings but people from other cultures may find that such a frank
statement itself is offensive or slighting of their culture. This is most
often a judgment call by the mediator.
The opposite approach to the culture factor is, of course, the stealth
approach. The mediator would keep the culture factor in mind and
remain alert to when it may be a problem. At such time as the culture
factor rears its ugly head, the mediator may want to mention it as a log-
jam breaker, possibly just to one side in a private caucus.
Another way to play the culture card is to "laugh it up." If the
parties are relatively sophisticated, experienced international negotiators,
the mediator can mention the culture factor as an ice-breaker, something
each side can laugh about. This has two effects. By pointing at it, this
maneuver can help break down the culture factor as a barrier to
settlement. In addition, this maneuver also helps build rapport with the
parties--"we now have something to laugh about together."
In addition to putting the culture card on the table, there are various
other ways for the mediator to cope with the culture issue. The mediator
might consider approaching the problem as a value conflict93 rather than
a culture conflict.94 In a multiple-party international mediation, the
mediator might want to consider the role the less powerful parties can
play in influencing the stronger parties by appealing to common
values.95 The mediator might analyze the problem in terms of five
cultural issues: language, assumptions, expectations, biases, and
values.96 The mediator might keep a checklist of "top ten tips" for
93. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 60-61 (2d Edition,
1996).
94. See Cynthia Savage, Culture and Mediation: A Red Herring 5 AM. U.J.
GENDER & LAW 269 (1996).
95. See Mary Jo Larson, Low Power Contributions in Multilateral Negotiations: A
Framework Analysis, 19 NEGOT. J. 133 (2003).
96. See SELMA MYERS & BARBARA FILNER, MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES: A
HANDBOOK ABOUT CONFLICT & CULTURE 39 (1993).
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avoiding cross cultural miscommunication. 97 The mediator can attempt
to bridge the culture gap by explaining the problem from one side to the
other and save the face of one side or the other.98 Finally, the parties
may want to think about who is the most appropriate mediator for their
problem based on various criteria. 99
CONCLUSION
The rise of global business necessarily entails the rise of global
disputes. Mediation is a flexible and powerful tool that is particularly
well-designed for the resolution of international business disputes.
Furthermore, the mediation technique can be tailored to fit the particular
problems presented by international business disputes. In particular, the
mediator needs to be sensitive to the number of deep differences among
countries, cultures, and areas of the world and take account of that in the
mediation. One technique that sometimes works (no technique always
works) is for the mediator to "play the cultural card": put it explicitly on
the table to the parties that various cultural differences amongst
themselves may present problems that the parties have to try to
surmount. Given the power and efficiency of mediation, business firms
should move forward to employ it as a means of resolving international
business disputes.
97. Julie Barker, International Mediation-A Better Alternative for the Resolution of
Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International
Commercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 52 (1996)
(highlighting major issues such as recognizing how culture affects bargaining tactics;
doing research and understanding how non-business factors such as family, religion and
historical influences effect the bargaining environment; showing respect and deference
to your counterparts' status and culture; being polite and dressing appropriately; being
patient, preparing for uncertainty and delay).
98. See Raymond Cohen, Cultural Aspects of Intl. Mediation, in RESOLVING INT'L
CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 107, 112-23 (Jacob Bercovitch
ed., 1996). See also Paul B. Pedersen & Fred E. Jandt, Culturally Contextual Models
for Creative Conflict Management, in CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (Fred E.
Jandt & Paul B. Pedersen eds., 1996) (analyzing case studies of the cultural aspects of
mediations in Asia).
99. See Chester A. Crocker et al., Ready for Prime Time: The When, Who and Why
of International Mediation, 19 NEGOT. J. 151, 151-67 (Apr. 2003) (advocating selection
of a mediator based on such factors as operational and political; strategic and
diplomatic; and relationship and cultural fit).
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